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 Abstract: 
 
 In his treatise The Right to the City, published in Paris just before the student riots of 
1968, Henri Lefebvre claims that inhabitants have a ‘right to the city’ which supersedes the 
rights of property owners and advocates ‘re-appropriation’ of the city, resulting in ‘collective 
ownership and management of space’. Lefebvre’s radical proposals inspired his students to 
take more direct action, and present-day movements such as the Occupy protests continue to 
cite his concept of ‘the right to the city’ as their inspiration. Shakespeare for his part, 
however, in his history plays presents what amounts to a nightmare counterpoint to 
Lefebvre’s dream. In 2 Henry VI, an analogue of ‘the right to the city’ appears as might be 
called ‘the right to the commons’. Far from bringing about any kind of ‘concrete utopia’, 
however, the Jack Cade Rebellion quickly degenerates into horrifying bloodshed. In Julius 
Caesar and Coriolanus, Shakespeare again presents what seems to be point-for-point 
opposition to anarchic populism such as Lefebvre’s. Shakespeare and Lefebvre share some 
important common ground, however, in their sense that mob violence is a response to 
subjective alienation, distinct from any more objective deprivation. Within the Hegelian 
tradition, Charles Taylor, Francis Fukuyama, and Axel Honneth have written extensively on 
the desire for recognition as an engine of political conflict. Violence is not always coldly 
calculating, but instead, spurred on by an emotion: indignation. More than any material 
change in what Marx would call the ‘conditions of production’, Shakespeare’s peasants and 
plebeians want to be recognized as worthy of respect; in the language of Coriolanus, they 
want their ‘voices’ to be heard. Riots and rebellions are their way of protecting that right. 
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Shakespeare and Henri Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the City’:  
Subjective Alienation and Mob Violence in Coriolanus, Julius Caesar, and 2 Henry VI 
 
 
 In his treatise The Right to the City, written and published in Paris just before the 
student riots of 1968, Henri Lefebvre claims that inhabitants of an urban space have a ‘right 
to the city’ which supersedes the rights of property owners and advocates re-appropriation of 
the city, resulting in ‘collective ownership and management of space’.1 This transformation 
requires ‘activation and mobilization of inhabitants’, spurred on by a vision of an ‘urgent 
utopia’.2 In 1968, Lefebvre was a lecturer at the University of Nanterre, the epicentre of the 
unrest; he gave a class to two-thousand-odd students on modernity and everyday life, and his 
radical proposals seem to have inspired many of his students to take direct action. In an 
interview, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the student leaders, described him as a ‘wonderful 
lecturer’.3 ‘He would seduce everybody’, Cohn-Bendit recalled, ‘just talk, telling anecdotes; 
he loved to talk and everybody loved his classes’. ‘I didn’t really know him personally’, he 
explained; ‘I was only one of many students in the audience. But his ideas on cultural 
revolution in everyday life, and on offering a different version of Marxism, influenced the 
Movement of March 22
nd’
.
4
 Prominent initiatives from the 1990s onwards such as the British 
Reclaim the Streets (RTS) collective and the worldwide Occupy movement owe their 
ideological provenance to Lefebvre’s work on space and the city, and a variety of other local 
movements, as well, expressly cite Lefebvre as their inspiration, including the South African 
shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo (abahlali.org); the German Recht auf 
Stadt network (rechtaufstadt.net); and, in the United States, the Right to the City Alliance 
(righttothecity.org).
5
  
In one of his earliest plays, 2 Henry VI, Shakespeare presents what seems, at least, to 
be a nightmare, dystopian counterpoint to Lefebvre’s dream. In his representation of the Jack 
3 
 
 
 
Cade Rebellion, an analogue of the ‘right to the city’ appears as what might be called the 
‘right to the commons’. Far from bringing about any kind of paradise, however, Cade’s 
political agitation quickly degenerates into horrifying civil strife. Later, in his depiction of the 
Roman Conflict of the Orders, Shakespeare seems once again to present what amounts to a 
point-for-point critique of the kind of populist reform of urban governance which Lefebvre 
proposes. In Julius Caesar, Mark Antony reveals to the crowd that Caesar has bequeathed 
them ‘all his walks, / His private arbours and new-planted orchards’ as ‘common pleasures’ 
(3.2.238–241).6 The result is not ‘utopia’, however, but frightening mob violence, 
culminating in the on-stage murder of an innocent bystander. In Coriolanus, the plebeians 
band together, banish an aristocratic war-hero, and for a time enjoy a peaceful urban 
commonwealth. Under threat of war, however, they realize they are not self-sufficient; their 
ability to live in peace requires the protection of the patricians.  
Shakespeare’s suspicion of armed popular uprising is not simply an expression of 
class prejudice, however. Communists such as Lefebvre are relatively optimistic about 
human nature; inclined to believe in the ‘perfectibility of man’, in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment or the French Revolution. Shakespeare in contrast is more Augustinian.
7
 
Human beings as such, of whatsoever social class, are unruly, self-interested, and prey to 
self-destructive passions: Hamlet’s ‘vicious mole of nature’ (1.4.24). 8 His plebeians, it is 
true, tend to be dim-witted and fickle. His patricians, however, tend to be arrogant and 
selfish. As Robert Miola explains, in his analysis of Julius Caesar, “Shakespeare’s portrayal 
of the fickle mob does not merely reflect anti-democratic prejudice or suggest the necessity 
for a strong ruler.” Seen in context, “the plebeians are the exact counterpart of the feckless 
Senate, the conspiring patricians, and, most important, the ambitious Caesar.” No one social 
class, still less, any one person, can be considered altogether “trustworthy.”9 
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 Given the intrinsic imperfections of human nature, the best possible outcome of class 
conflict, as Shakespeare sees it, is neither tyranny, oligarchy, nor mob rule -- still less, an 
implausible Marxist utopia -- but instead an uneasy balance of power. As James Madison 
explains, in his celebrated defence of the American constitution, ‘Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition’. Fear of the breakdown of civic order on the part of the aristocracy, 
coupled with fear of punishment on the part of the commoners, allows each class to restrain 
the potential excesses of the other. The king for his part keeps them unified, at least in theory, 
both as a talisman and as a power broker. In the popular imagination, the king serves as an 
imagined court of appeal for the claims of the poor against the injustices of the rich. 
Likewise, the king himself is kept in check by the watchful eye of the nobility. ‘It may be a 
reflection on human nature,’ Madison muses, ‘that such devices should be necessary to 
control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary’.10   
 
1. The Politics of Recognition 
 
 In the early 1990s, proponents of the politics of recognition began to argue that 
alongside material or economic deprivation, there is an additional, more powerful force 
driving social and political struggle: the desire for recognition. The starting-point of this 
‘politics of recognition’ is Hegel’s dialectic of the development of self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. At the beginning of the section on lordship and bondage, Hegel 
posits that ‘self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists 
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’.11 Charles Taylor re-articulates this 
argument in his seminal essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition’; as he explains there, ‘the 
genesis of the human mind is … not monological, not something each person accomplishes 
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on his or her own, but dialogical’. Taylor’s revival of Hegel set the stage for a more pervasive 
move which extends the application of Hegel’s dialectic to a wide field of social groups.12 ‘A 
number of strands in contemporary politics’, Taylor writes, ‘turn on the need, sometimes the 
demand for recognition’. As examples of social movements driven by this desire, he draws 
attention more specifically to nationalism, feminism, and multiculturalism.
13
 Advocates of 
these positions want something more than money or even legal powers of coercion: their 
more fundamental aim is for their narrative, their sense of themselves, to be respected. They 
want, in other words, a subjective change in the way they are perceived, alongside, emerging 
out of, but distinct from, any more objective economic reparations or institutional reform. 
 Writing around the same time, Francis Fukuyama and Axel Honneth place recognition 
at the centre not just of contemporary social struggle, but of the whole of human societal 
development. The desire for recognition, according to Fukuyama, is ‘the motor of history’.14 
‘As interpreted by Alexandre Kojève’, he writes, ‘Hegel provides us with an alternative 
“mechanism” by which to understand the historical process, one based on the ‘struggle for 
recognition’.15 Likewise for Honneth, ‘motives for social resistance and rebellion are formed 
in the context of moral experiences stemming from the violation of deeply rooted 
expectations regarding recognition’.16 Honneth sees recognition as fundamental to the 
development of history: ‘It is by way of the morally motivated struggles of social groups – 
their collective attempt to establish, institutionally and culturally, expanded forms of 
reciprocal recognition – that the normatively directional change of societies proceeds’.17 
 Turning back to Shakespeare for a moment, it is perhaps for this reason, the desire for 
recognition, that the plebeians in Coriolanus speak of their ‘voices’, rather than their ‘votes’.  
Coriolanus baulks at the custom that those running for consul must petition the citizens in 
public for their acceptance. As one of the tribunes, Brutus, recalls,  
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  I heard him swear 
Were he to stand for consul, never would he  
Appear i’th’ market-place nor on him put 
The napless vesture of humility, 
Nor showing, as the manner is, his wounds 
To th’ people, beg their stinking breaths.  (2.1.225-29)  
 
As the other tribune, Sicinius, is quick to remind him, however, ‘Sir, the people / Must have 
their voices, neither will they bate / One jot of ceremony’ (2.2.138–9).18 Conversation is 
integral to immediate, everyday intersubjective recognition, and it is for this reason that the 
citizens set such store by it. The ‘voice’ is a more visceral representation of the self than a 
‘vote’. In his Politics, Aristotle singles out language as proof that man is inextricably social: 
‘that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident,’ 
he writes; “nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom 
she has endowed with the gift of speech’ (1.2).19 
 From the perspective of Hegelian political philosophy, the traditional process of 
standing for consul which Coriolanus must endure in the marketplace amounts to a 
straightforward swap, so to speak, of interpersonal respect. He is to show the scars of his 
battle-wounds to all and sundry, and in exchange, in light of his evident military service, they 
will support his standing for consul. As the Third Citizen explains, ‘If he show us his wounds 
and tell us his deeds […] we must also tell him our noble acceptance of them. […] Ingratitude 
is monstrous’ (2.3.5–9). Coriolanus, however, struggles to understand the necessity of the 
custom. ‘‘Twas never my desire yet’, he tells one of the citizens, ‘to trouble the poor with 
begging’ (2.3.68-9). But the process is far from dispensable, given what it represents. By 
petitioning the citizens of Rome for their voices, Coriolanus is obliged to recognize, not 
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merely their role in the political system, but their very existence; their essential worth. The 
show of respect that he chafes at is an important safeguard against a dangerous subjective 
alienation. By attempting to avoid it, or else to undermine it with dismissive sarcasm, 
Coriolanus all-but-inevitably provokes the violent retaliation he incurs, leading ultimately to 
his being banished from the city. 
 
 2: The Right to the City 
 
 Lefebvre’s own historical touchstone is not, as it is for Shakespeare, ancient Rome, 
but instead, the Paris Commune of 1871, which he sees as a reaction against the reforms of 
Baron Haussman. Prefect of the Seine under Napoleon III, Baron Haussman demolished and 
rebuilt much of Paris. He tore down crowded, working-class neighbourhoods, full of crooked 
alleys, and replaced them with uniform buildings and broad boulevards, displacing, by his 
own estimation, some 350,000 inhabitants. His aims were political as well as aesthetic: the 
new city plan allowed freer movement of troops and artillery, including if necessary to 
subdue the Parisians themselves. As Lefebvre writes, the ‘victorious bourgeoisie carved up 
the existing space and quartered, shattered, and rearranged it to suit its own requirements […] 
this process has not stopped since, but still continues today’.20 Visiting Fredric Jameson in 
California, Lefebvre found in Los Angeles an especially pronounced example of this ongoing 
marginalization of the masses, a city both ‘detestable’ and ‘fascinating’: 
 
For a European it’s appalling and unlivable. You can’t get around without a car and 
you pay exorbitant sums to park it. […] What fascinates and disgusts me are the 
streets of luxury shops with superb windows but which you can’t enter into […] 
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These streets are empty. And not far from there, you have a street, a neighbourhood, 
where 200,000 Salvadorian immigrants are exploited to death in cellars and lofts.
21
 
 
 For Lefebvre, space is not a neutral site or container for class conflict, but instead an 
object of that struggle; a social product which has itself become commodified. Urban 
centrality is at a premium, and it has come to be understood in terms of its exchange value, 
rather than its use value. Examples might include the controversial recent trend towards 
absentee foreign owners in New York and London, purchasing prime real estate in the urban 
centre as investments, and in the process driving up housing prices beyond what city workers 
can afford.
22
 The frontier of the new class conflict, Lefebvre argues, ‘does not divide city and 
country but cuts across the urban phenomenon, between a dominated periphery and a 
dominating center’.23  
 For Lefebvre, the Paris Commune of 1871 represents a viable alternative. For 
seventy-odd days, Paris workers sympathetic to socialism came in from the banlieues to 
which they had been displaced, organized themselves in councils, and proclaimed their 
independence, until at last they were suppressed by the French military. In his pre-1968 book, 
La Proclamation de la Commune, written in 1965, Lefebvre exhorts the reader to 
‘rehabilitate’ this ‘dream, otherwise utopian’, and presents the Commune as a model for 
‘creative praxis’, despite its rapid collapse in its own time.24 ‘Its failures are also victories, 
openings on to the future, a standard to be seized, a truth to be maintained. What was 
impossible for the Communards stays until this day impossible, and, by consequence, 
behoves us to realize its possibility’.25 Writing in 1969, Lefebvre presents the student riots of 
1968 as fulfilling this vision, even if only temporarily. ‘The students reoccupied the Latin 
Quarter; they re-appropriated the space that had been taken from them and reconquered it in a 
sharp struggle […] A concrete utopia now proclaimed a unified culture transcending the 
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division of labor’.26 He draws an explicit parallel between the two movements: ‘In March 
1871 as in May 1968, people who had come from the outlying areas into which they had been 
driven and where they had found nothing but a social void assembled and proceeded together 
toward the reconquest of the urban centers’.27 
 These moments are exceptional, however. More typically, Lefebvre explains, the 
proletariat has become ‘dispensable’, consigned to ‘peripheral enclaves for dispersed 
enterprises’. The ‘working class, victim of segregation’, has been ‘expelled from the 
traditional city, deprived of a present and possible urban life’.28 In its most basic sense, the 
right to the city means the right of those who work there to live there, as well, and to spend 
their leisure time there. In Lefebvre’s terms, it is the right of those who use the city to inhabit 
the city. In its more comprehensive sense, however, the right to the city is political and social: 
it mandates that all classes, even the poorest, should be able to participate equally in the “life” 
of a city, a collective ‘oeuvre’ akin to a work of art.29 As Lefebvre sees it, ‘to exclude the 
urban from groups, classes, individuals, is also to exclude them from civilization, if not from 
society itself. The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from 
urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization’.30  
 
 3. Autogestion 
 
Mario Rui Martins reformulates Lefebvre’s concept in more explicit terms: ‘the right 
to the city’ refers to ‘the right to be present in all circuits of decision-making leading to the 
control and development of the organization of social space and therefore the refusal of 
having one’s space-time controlled by external forces (state, capitalist urbanism, etc.)’.31 This 
empowerment extends well beyond commonplace tokenistic forms of participation such as 
public information campaigns and community consultation processes: the kind of more 
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superficial engagement which, as we will see, Hegel recommends in his Politics. Instead, 
Lefebvre imagines all-pervasive power-sharing, a form of direct democracy which he calls 
autogestion. ‘Without autogestion’, he insists, ‘“participation” has no meaning’.32  
Autogestion means, literally, ‘self-management’, but it is perhaps best left 
untranslated, in order to preserve its association with radical leftism in Europe in the 1970s, 
including especially, workers taking control of factories. ‘Each time a social group (generally 
the productive workers) refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, of life or 
survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to master its own 
conditions of existence, autogestion is occurring’.33 In contrast to Stalinist Communism, the 
term implies a radical decentralization of power: direct democracy on a relatively small scale, 
as opposed to the totalizing sway of an overweening state. As Lefebvre explains, ‘The state 
cannot coexist peacefully with radicalized and generalized autogestion, as it must be put 
under the democratic control “of the base”. The state of autogestion, that is to say a State in 
which an internalized autogestion gains power, could only be a State that is withering away.’ 
Self-management is, in other words, ‘the end of politics’.34  
Theoretically, as opposed to historically, Lefebvre’s model for this utopian ideal, one 
which he insists, despite appearances, it is in fact possible to render ‘concrete’ and 
permanent, is Rabelais’ account of the Abbey of Thélème, a unique, libertarian ‘monastery’ 
without clocks or vows, and open to women as well as men. As Rabelais explains,  
 
‘All their life was laid out not by laws, statutes, or rules but according to their will and 
free choice. They got up out of bed when they saw fit, drank, ate, worked, slept when 
they came to feel like doing so; no one waked them, no one forced them either to 
drink or eat or to do anything else whatever. Thus Gargantua had established it. In 
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their rule was only this clause: DO WHAT YOU WILL [FAY CE QUE 
VOULDRAS].’  
 
In his 1955 study, titled simply, Rabelais, Lefebvre argues that Rabelais presents here a 
‘vision of the possible human,’ a ‘communist utopia,’ ‘an image of man fully developed, in a 
free society.’35 This ‘vision’ is grounded in Rabelais’ relative optimism about human nature. 
Defending the plausibility of his Abbey, Rabelais maintains that ‘people who are free, well 
born, well bred, moving in honourable social circles, have by nature an instinct and goad 
which always impels them to virtuous deeds and holds them back from vice’.36 Shakespeare 
in contrast is not so optimistic. As Hamlet says, somewhat cryptically, ‘virtue cannot so 
inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it’ (3.1.116-8).37 In Measure for Measure, Lucio 
stumbles across a friend of his, Claudio, being led away in chains, arrested on charges of 
fornication. ‘Why, how now, Claudio!’ he asks. ‘Whence comes this restraint?’ ‘From too 
much liberty, my Lucio, liberty,’ Claudio replies.   
 
As surfeit is the father of much fast,  
So every scope by the immoderate use  
Turns to restraint. Our natures do pursue,  
Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,  
A thirsty evil; and when we drink we die. (1.2) 
 
Claudio’s simile here resembles St. Peter’s quotation from the Book of Proverbs in the New 
Testament, describing Christians who backslide into sin: ‘It is come unto them according to 
the true proverb, The dog is returned to his own vomit: and the sow that was washed, to the 
wallowing in the mire.’38 Given this sense of human nature as fallen, imperfect, and 
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unreliable, it is little surprise that Shakespeare does not share Lefebvre’s dreams of a secular 
utopia. Even Rousseau, intellectual cornerstone of the French Revolution, sees direct 
democracy of the kind Lefebvre proposes as hopelessly impracticable. ‘If there were a people 
of gods’, he suggests, ‘they would be able to govern themselves democratically’. ‘Such a 
perfect government’, however, ‘is not fitting for human beings’.39 
Lefebvre was not aware of Bakhtin’s study, Rabelais and His World; although written 
in the 1930s, it was not translated into French until 1970. His sense of Rabelais, however, 
corresponds fairly closely to Bakhtin’s account of the ‘carnivalesque’. As Andy Merrifield 
observes, Lefebvre’s Marxism was ‘Rabelaisian’ in spirit, ‘prioritizing “lived moments”, 
irruptive acts of contestation: building occupations and street demos, free expressionist art 
and theatre, flying pickets, rent strikes, and a general strike’.40 His ideal for revolutionary 
practice was explicitly the rural festival, especially the medieval French Fête des Fous, held 
annually on New Year’s Day; an inversion of convention and an ‘explosion of forces’ which 
he believed ultimately ‘tightened social links’.41 In his study of the Paris Commune of 1871, 
Lefebvre describes it as ‘first of all, an immense, grandiose festival’. A ‘festival of the 
disinherited’, he writes, describing the Communards, a ‘festival of revolution’, ‘the grandest 
of modern times, unfurls itself for the first time in all its dramatic magnificent joy’.42 
 
4: Objective Alienation 
 
Shakespeare’s representation of urban riots and peasant rebellion almost entirely 
contradicts Lefebvre’s more optimistic vision, even at the cost of some distortion to the 
historical record. According to the Tudor historian Raphael Holinshed, one of Shakespeare’s 
chief sources, the rebel leader Jack Cade was ‘right pregnant of wit’, ‘sober in talke’ and 
‘wise in reasoning’, even if he was also ‘arrogant in hart, and stiffe in opinion’.43 Historically, 
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he sought to rein in the corruption of the king’s counsellors and advisors, rather than to take 
action against the king himself. In Southwark his conduct was that of ‘prohibiting to all his 
retinue, murder, rape, and robberie; by which colour of well meaning, he the more allured to 
him the harts of the common people.’44 In the Mirror for Magistrates (1559), Cade’s 
insurrection is again presented not without some sympathy, as an example of divine 
retribution against a king, given his irresponsible management of cruel officers.
45
  
Like many of his contemporaries, however, Shakespeare conflates Cade’s 1450 
rebellion with that of Jack Straw and Wat Tyler in 1381. As the play suggests, Cade did 
indeed order the Lord High Treasurer, Lord Say, and his son-in-law to be beheaded, and his 
followers did place their heads on pikes and parade them through the streets of London, 
occasionally pushing them together to make them appear to kiss each other. As Brents 
Stirling points out, however, ‘Most of the violence and outrage in Shakespeare’s version of 
the Cade uprising came from the chronicle story of the earlier Peasants’ Revolt,’ including 
their wish to kill all lawyers, their opposition to literacy, the destruction of the Inns of Court, 
the destruction of state documents, and Cade’s adoption of Wat Tyler’s vow that ‘all the laws 
of England should come forth out of his mouth’.46 ‘Away, burn all the records of the realm,’ 
Cade cries; ‘my mouth shall be the parliament of England’ (4.7.11–13).47 Richard Wilson 
sees Cade as ‘metamorphosed’ here into ‘a cruel, barbaric lout, whose slogan is “kill and 
knock down”, and whose story, as “the architect of disorder”, is one long orgy of scatological 
clowning, arson, and homicide, fuelled by an infantile hatred of literacy and law’.48 
In keeping with Lefebvre’s sense of protest as a kind of ‘festival’, Francois Laroque 
describes Shakespeare’s Cade’s speeches as ‘inspired by the vein of parodic eloquence that a 
Lord of Misrule would favour during the Christmas festival’, and Cade himself as ‘a Carnival 
king whose reign ushers in the era of a world set upside down’.49 What Lefebvre presents as 
joyous and liberating, however, Shakespeare presents in contrast as seguing rapidly from 
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funny to frightening; even horrifying; an outbreak of senseless and unpredictable violence. 
One incident stands out: Cade and his men execute the otherwise-innocent Clerk of Chartham 
simply for being able to read and write. Likewise in Julius Caesar, an angry mob abruptly 
and pointlessly slaughters the poet Cinna, merely because his name resembles that of a 
senator, Cinna, who was one of the conspirators against Caesar. As in Plato’s Republic, the 
masses seem hardly capable of reason. In Brutus’s funeral oration, for example, defending his 
assassination of Caesar, he exhorts the crowd to see themselves as ‘free men’ (3.2.24) and 
urges them to embrace the longstanding principles of the Roman Republic, founded in the 
aftermath of the expulsion of the Tarquins. Their response is telling: clean contrary to 
Brutus’s premises, they propose crowning Brutus king, as they had earlier tried to do to 
Caesar: ‘Caesar’s better parts / Shall be crown’d in Brutus’ (3.2.51–2). 
Despite their incapacity for strict logic, however, Shakespeare’s rioters are not 
entirely foolish or wrongheaded. Their grievances have merit. The turning point in Antony’s 
funeral oration, after which the crowd breaks out in violence against the conspirators against 
Caesar, is his reading of Caesar’s will, in which, Antony claims, Caesar distributes his money 
and land to the citizens of Rome: ‘To every Roman citizen he gives, / To every several man, 
seventy-five drachmas’, and so on (3.2.234–5). Shakespeare evokes here the populism by 
which, as Montaigne says, ‘Caesar became Caesar’.50 The equivalent of the enclosure crisis 
in Caesar’s Rome was the rise of vast plantations or latifundia, driving traditional 
smallholders out of business by taking advantage of slave labour and economies of scale; 
dispossessed poor ended up landless in Rome, much as they did in Shakespeare’s London, 
and dependent on government largesse. Caesar’s political success reflected his willingness to 
cater to the interest of this new social class; despite the objections of rival optimates such as 
Cato and Brutus, he insisted on the provision of what we would now call welfare: Juvenal’s 
‘bread and circuses’. The same tension reappears in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, where the 
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focus of the debate is explicitly the dole: the traditional handout of a daily measure of free 
grain to Roman citizens. In keeping with the ancient Conflict of the Orders, Coriolanus, an 
aristocrat, balks at the very concept of giving away free food to the poor: ‘corn 
o’th’storehouse gratis, as ‘twas used / Sometime in Greece’ (3.1.115-6). 
The Roman food riots which Shakespeare depicts in Coriolanus had their counterpart 
in his own early modern England. Buchanan Sharp cites at least forty riots in England 
between 1586 and 1631, ‘all of which were related in some way to the state of the food 
market’.51 The other main cause of riots was the practice of ‘enclosure’. As Alan Everitt 
explains, ‘important though the labourer’s individual smallholding was, the vital factor in his 
fortunes was his rights of common’, especially ‘his grazing rights on common pastures’. 
Other crucial goods dependent on these traditional privileges included stone, coal, peat, 
firewood, timber, game, fish, fruit, herbs, and berries. ‘Poor though they seem, these rights 
alone added a few simple graces to an otherwise bare existence, and bred in the labourer a 
sense of hope and independence’. As Everitt notes, however, ‘Such an economy was 
peculiarly vulnerable … to the new economic forces of the period’.52 In the years comprising 
Shakespeare’s own lifetime, Roger B. Manning identifies hundreds of riots in England 
‘protesting enclosures of commons and wastes, drainage of fens and disafforestation’.53 
 Shakespeare touches on this nerve of controversy when Antony tells the Roman 
crowd, in his peroration, that Caesar has left them ‘his walks, / His private arbours and new-
planted orchards’, to them and their heirs ‘for ever’, as ‘common pleasures’ (3.2.238–241). 
Jack Cade addresses the problem even more directly when he vows, ‘all the realm shall be in 
common; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass’ (4.2.63–4). ‘All things’, he repeats, 
‘shall be in common’ (4.7.16). In his insistence on this point, Cade echoes the demands of 
Wat Tyler and the earlier Peasants’ Revolt. In Holinshed’s account, Tyler demands of the 
king that ‘all warrens, waters, parks, and woods should be common, so that as well poore as 
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rich might freelie in any place wheresoever practise fishing in ponds, pooles, rivers, or any 
waters, and might hunt deere in forrests and parkes, and the hare in the fields.’54  
 For Shakespeare’s contemporaries, the equivalent of Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ was 
what might be called a ‘right to the commons’. Like Lefebvre’s Paris workers, driven out 
from the city centre to the banlieues, Shakespeare’s peasants are aggrieved to find themselves 
shut out of land which they had traditionally been allowed to use, and which they see as 
integral to their everyday quality of life. They perceive their exclusion as an injustice, even if 
it is, strictly speaking, legal. In both cases, the exchange value of a space to property owners 
is allowed to supersede its use value to would-be inhabitants, prompting indignation and 
violent resistance. The deprivation which provokes working-class riot and rebellion in 
Shakespeare’s plays is not merely material, however, but also emotional. As Yves-Marie 
Bercé explains, ‘The trigger of revolt is not destitution, but injustice – and not objective 
injustice, but the conviction of it.’55 Shakespeare’s mobs are responding to insult, as well as 
injury; their violence is not so much a calculated tactic as it is a more visceral reaction to their 
sense of being subjected to high-handed contempt. In other words, they are responding to 
subjective as well as objective alienation. And on this point, the signal importance of 
subjective alienation, as distinct from objective, Shakespeare and Lefebvre share some 
important common ground. 
 
5: Subjective Alienation 
 
In marked contrast to the orthodox or, as he called it, ‘dogmatic’ Marxism of his day, 
-- the ‘party line’, literally, coming out of the Soviet Union -- Lefebvre was at pains to insist 
that the alienation of the working class was more than merely economic. Until the late 1950s, 
Lefebvre was a member of the French Communist Party, which at that time, in keeping with 
17 
 
 
 
its staunch defence of Stalinism, posited a clear distinction between ‘early’ and ‘late’ Marx. 
Marx’s early works were seen as tainted by Hegelian idealism, too humanist and too 
philosophical, whereas his later works were cast as more reliably materialist and economic:  
‘scientific’.56 Lefebvre in contrast advocated a holistic reading of Marx, one that in time led 
him to break ties with the Party. ‘The fact that economic science and political action had 
superseded speculative philosophy fostered the false conclusion’, he complained, ‘that Marx 
had abandoned any conception of the philosophical world’.57  
Marx articulates his theory of ‘alienation’ most fully in his Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts. The origins of his later emphasis on economic alienation are 
already evident here in his sense that private property is both ‘the product of alienated labor’ 
and ‘the means by which labor alienates itself’.58 Yet the Manuscripts also support 
Lefebvre’s more Hegelian sense of Marx’s thought, insofar as Marx claims here that the 
alienation of the worker includes his alienation from other men. ‘For Marx’, Lefebvre writes, 
‘the alienation of the worker by fragmented labour and machines is only one aspect of a 
larger – a total – alienation which is inherent in capitalist society and in man’s exploitation of 
man’.59 ‘Workers do not only have a life in the workplace’, Lefebvre argues; ‘they have a 
social life, family life, political life; they have experiences outside the domain of labor’.60 
There is ‘alienation in leisure just as in work’.61 
Lefebvre attributes much of the subjective alienation of everyday life to individuals’ 
objective relation in space. In being pushed out of the urban centre, the common man is 
deprived, not only of potential economic gain, but also of the shared social and political life 
necessary to become a complete or what Lefebvre calls a ‘total’ human being. ‘The total 
man’, Lefebvre writes, ‘is “de-alienated” man’. ‘Human alienation will end with “the return 
of man to himself”, that is to say in the unity of all the elements of the human’.62 As Andy 
Merrifield explains, ‘the total man represents a goal, an ideal, a possibility, not a historical 
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fact; it may never become an actual fact’.63 For Lefebvre, however, the unattainability of the 
aim he posits seems to be relatively unimportant. ‘Utopia never realizes itself’, he concedes, 
‘yet it is indispensable for stimulating change.’64  
The polar opposite of Lefebvre’s ‘de-alienated man’ is what Hegel calls ‘the rabble’ 
(der Pöbel). ‘When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of 
living’, Hegel maintains, ‘that feeling of right, integrity, and honour which comes from 
supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost. This leads to the creation of a 
rabble’ (§ 244).65 This definition, taken from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, acknowledges that 
poverty is fundamentally economic: it begins when people find themselves below what Hegel 
refers to as ‘a certain standard of living’. When the poor become what he calls a ‘rabble’, 
however, it is the result of a more subjective change: the loss of ‘that feeling of right, 
integrity, and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work’. 
‘Poverty in itself’, he argues, ‘does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by 
the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, 
against government, etc.’ (§ 244A). 
For Hegel, poverty has ‘a subjective aspect’ which ‘requires subjective help, both with 
regard to the particular circumstances and with regard to emotion and love’ (§ 242). Using 
‘direct means’ to ‘maintain the increasingly impoverished mass at its normal standard of 
living’ is not enough; instead, the poor need something that gives them a ‘feeling of self-
sufficiency and honour’ (§ 245). That is to say, simply handing out welfare checks is not an 
adequate or advisable solution to the problem of poverty, as Hegel sees it. In addition, the 
poor need to feel that they are participants in civil society, part of a political unity. They need 
to feel invested in a common good like that described by Lefebvre when he speaks of the 
urban life of a city as an oeuvre, a collective work of art.  
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Otherwise, Hegel argues, ‘it follows that those who are dependent on contingency 
become frivolous and lazy […] This in turn gives rise to the evil that the rabble do not have 
sufficient honour to gain their livelihood through their own work, yet claim that they have a 
right to receive their livelihood’ (§ 244A). Of course, it is not necessarily the fault of the poor 
that they are in poverty. If poverty arose from a state of nature, Hegel observes, it would not 
be possible to complain against it: ‘No one can assert a right against nature,’ he writes, ‘but 
within the conditions of society hardship at once assumes the form of a wrong inflicted on 
this or that class’ (§ 244, emphasis added). In civil society, Hegel maintains, poverty is a 
deliberate wrong inflicted on a class. Yet his thought seems at odds with itself. As noted, in 
the preceding paragraph, Hegel attacks the rabble for ‘claiming that they have a right to 
receive their livelihood’ while at the same time being too lazy to earn it.  The cognitive 
dissonance is startling: within the space of a few lines, Hegel both condemns the poor for 
their obstreperous behaviour and accepts that they have entirely legitimate reasons for their 
‘inward rebellion’. 
The contentious critical reception of Shakespeare’s ambiguous representation of 
working-class political violence suggests that he may have felt a similar ambivalence, seeing 
it simultaneously, like Hegel, as both wrong-headed and justified. Stephen Greenblatt argues 
that ‘Shakespeare depicts Cade’s rebellion as a grotesque and sinister farce, the archetypal 
lower class revolt both in its motives and in its ludicrousness’.66 Phyllis Rackin sees 
Shakespeare’s representation of Cade’s rebellion as ‘tainted’ by ‘comedy’, despite ‘the 
vividness of Cade’s characterization and the real social ills his rebellion addresses’.67 Richard 
Helgerson claims that Shakespeare’s ‘mockery of Jack Cade, in particular,’ is ‘open and 
unmistakeable … Even his followers mock him’. Helgerson goes on to argue that ‘the part 
was likely enacted by the company’s clown’, and that ‘Cade and his followers were 
associated with carnival and carnivalesque misrule’.68  In several articles, however, as well as 
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his recent book, Radical Shakespeare, Chris Fitter argues for a very different sense of 
Shakespeare’s underlying political sympathies. ‘Shakespeare’s treatment of popular rising in 
this play [2 Henry VI]’, Fitter proposes, ‘reveals a generous and complex vision, which, 
though conditioned by awareness of possible anarchic degeneration, and pessimism about its 
larger transformative possibilities given the phenomenon of leadership betrayal,  nonetheless 
includes – pace the dominant critical tradition – conditional endorsement of armed 
uprising.’69 Like Fitter, Ronda Arab sees the rebels as ‘remarkably appealing’. ‘Part of the 
attraction of the rebels in 2 Henry VI is their merry carnival-like approach to subverting the 
social order.’ That said, however, ‘never does their festive merriment obscure their horrific 
ruthlessness.’70 Arab aligns herself in the end with Michael Hattaway’s sense of the play’s 
‘double perspective’: the audience watches the rebellion ‘with a degree of horror but also 
with a degree of glee as the privileged get their comeuppance.’71  
Hegel’s ambivalence about the place of the poor may perhaps shed some light by 
analogy on Shakespeare’s thought. Like Hegel, Shakespeare seems to acknowledge, even if 
only indirectly, the legitimacy of the grievances of what Hegel would call ‘the rabble’. His 
sympathy for their plight dissipates, however, when they turn to violence. Pace Fitter, for 
Shakespeare, as for Hegel, armed popular uprising is a symptom of a failure of aristocratic 
governance, rather than itself a solution to that problem. In other words, for Shakespeare, as 
for Hegel, the ideal political response to the discontent of the poor is not for the poor 
themselves to take action; not riot or rebellion; but instead, for those in authority to prevent 
the subjective alienation which gives rise to such mob violence in the first place. If the elite 
are sufficiently attentive, responsive, and respectful, then the vast, potentially-unmanageable 
public Coriolanus dismisses as unworthy of appeasement, ‘the many-headed multitude’ 
(2.3.15-16), has no cause to become restive, unruly, and dangerous, as it does, predictably 
enough, in Coriolanus’ Rome, in reaction to his insistent insults and scorn, or in 2 Henry VI, 
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in the wake of the prolonged neglect and de facto abdication of their feckless king, Henry VI. 
Ritual recognition of the fellow humanity of the masses; public engagement acknowledging 
their co-existence; these simple, largely symbolic gestures serve as the proverbial ‘sop to 
Cerberus’, preventing popular agitation against the existing political order. We today may be 
inclined, like Lefebvre, to see working-class riot and rebellion as heroic. For Shakespeare, 
however, this kind of mob violence is a social ill, akin to civil war. 
 
6: Hegel’s Politics 
 
 In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel lays out the structure of a political state designed, 
among other things, to prevent the subjective alienation of the poor – although his notorious 
hostility to democracy may at first suggest otherwise.
72
 In Hegel’s system, the sovereign 
comprises not only the hereditary monarch, but also individuals who hold ‘the highest 
advisory offices’ (§§ 280, 283). These advisors submit proposals to the monarch, which he 
then ratifies (§ 283). Although technically, then, a constitutional monarchy, as Michael 
Hardimon observes, in Hegel’s proposed state, ‘the real work of governing’ is carried out not 
by the king, but by civil servants.
73
 These positions, moreover, may be filled by anyone: 
‘knowledge and proof of ability’ is the sole condition of appointment, which ‘guarantees 
every citizen the possibility of joining’ (§291). In this limited sense, Hegel believes that 
anyone should be eligible to enter government.  
 What Hegel does not believe, however, is that everyone should play a part in the 
affairs of state, as all citizens do in a democracy, electing leaders on the basis of ideological 
platforms. Hegel believes such universal participation in government is ill-advised. ‘The idea 
that everyone should participate in the concerns of the state entails the further assumption that 
everyone is an expert on such matters’ (§308R).  Moreover, ‘the electorate becomes 
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indifferent in view of the fact that a single vote has little effect when numbers are so large’ 
(§311R). Given that relatively few people participate directly in government, alienation might 
easily set in; a danger Hegel acknowledges. The elected deputies that make their way into the 
legislative power do, however, have some influence in the formulation of policy. They are 
able to provide state officials with extra insight into ‘the more urgent and specialized needs 
and deficiencies which they see in concrete form before their eyes’ among the people they 
represent (§301R). They ‘uphold’ the interests of the individual ‘in an assembly which deals 
with universal issues’ (§ 309R), and they ‘participate’ in the government’s ‘knowledge, 
deliberations, and decisions on matters of universal concern’ (§ 314). 
Nevertheless, the role of these elected deputies is not primarily to assist in governing. 
‘The highest officials within the state’, Hegel argues, ‘are able to do what is best even 
without the Estates, just as they must continue to do what is best when the Estates are in 
session’ (§ 301R). Policy, again, in Hegel’s system is formulated by civil servants, rather than 
elected representatives, and passed on to the monarch for approval, rather than the legislature. 
The Estates serve primarily as a ‘mediating organ’, whose distinctive function is to ensure 
that ‘the moment of formal freedom attains its right in relation to those members of civil 
society who have no share in government’ (§§ 302, 314). That is to say, in plainer language, 
the core purpose of the Estates is not in fact to legislate at all, but instead to give the 
disenfranchised masses a feeling of connection to processes which they do not in any sense 
directly or even indirectly influence. To achieve this end, the Estates deputies participate in a 
‘forum for live exchanges and collective deliberations in which the participants [government 
officials and Estates deputies] instruct and convince one another’ (§ 309). The aim of these 
exchanges is not to affect policy, but instead and more simply to help the public feel less 
alienated from their own government. ‘The determination of the Estates as an institution does 
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not require them to achieve optimum results in their deliberations and decisions on the 
business of the state in itself, for their role in this respect is purely accessory’ (§314).  
Public debate of this kind, Hegel maintained in his lectures, would allow state powers 
to ‘remain in touch’ with public opinion and ‘afford a great spectacle of outstanding 
educational value to the citizens’ (§315A). By ‘ensuring that the power of the sovereign does 
not appear as an isolated extreme’, the Estates in theory at least would prevent the public 
from becoming ‘a massive power in opposition to the organic state’ (§ 302). We may debate 
today the merits of this hypothetical safeguard against the danger of subjective alienation. 
What Hegel shares with Lefebvre, however, as well as Shakespeare, is a sense of a potential 
problem. When the masses feel estranged from the authorities who handle the real business of 
government, mob violence is imminent. The excluded great unwashed, so to speak, are likely 
to reassert a balance of power through riot and rebellion, if only to recover their own sense 
that they are recognized as worthy of respect. 
 
7. Riot and Rebellion 
 
Like Shakespeare, Hegel singles out Rome as a place where the poor, being excluded 
altogether from the political processes of their own state, were allowed to degenerate into 
what he describes as a ‘corrupt rabble’ (§ 357) In the late Republic and early Empire, the 
common people were increasingly shut out of any meaningful political participation. The 
poor could not obtain redress of their grievances, including especially an end to recurrent 
food shortages.
74
 As P. A. Brunt observes, the constitution came to operate in practice ‘only 
in the interest of the ruling class’.75 Reformers therefore had to use force, ‘or at least to create 
conditions in which the senate had reason to fear its use’.76 Thomas Africa draws attention 
more specifically to the importance of the Circus as a venue for public dissent. ‘The Roman 
24 
 
 
 
commons could only petition the emperor through mass demonstrations,’ he explains. ‘If he 
failed to heed their demands, they sometimes resorted to violence’.77 Consequently, ‘most 
emperors were receptive to public opinion as represented by the multitude in the Circus’.78 
Likewise, in the early Republic, before the tribunes were established to protect the plebeians, 
urban violence was the means of last resort; the only remaining point of leverage in the 
Conflict of the Orders. In Coriolanus, Shakespeare dramatizes this period of transition.  The 
people ‘vented their complainings’, Martius explains, and a ‘petition’ was granted them, ‘a 
strange one, / To break the heart of generosity / And make bold power look pale’ (1.1.205-7). 
The concession turns out to be ‘Five tribunes to defend their vulgar wisdoms, / Of their own 
choice’ (1.1.210-11). 
Understanding riot and rebellion as a reaction against alienation helps to make sense 
of Jack Cade’s and his companions’ murderous opposition to literacy. In a well-known line, 
Dick the Butcher declares that the first thing the rebels will do is ‘kill all the lawyers’ 
(4.2.71). But he does not stop there: ‘All scholars, lawyers, courtiers, gentlemen’ are to be put 
to death (4.4.35–36). The clerk of Chartham is accordingly hanged ‘with his pen and inkhorn 
about his neck’ (4.2.101). The scene resembles the notorious Killing Fields of the Khmer 
Rouge, where supposed intellectuals were put to death for little more than, for instance, being 
known to use reading glasses.
79
 Even if horrifying, however, the rebellion’s impulse to kill all 
the literate is more than merely ‘gross and miserable ignorance’ (4.2.158), as Stafford 
describes it. The commons are angry because they feel that their inability to read and write 
unfairly excludes them from full and equal participation in the political process. They are in 
the dark, estranged from their own state; poverty cuts them off from the intellectual capital 
they need even to understand the law, much less to manipulate it in their own interest. Cade 
deplores that parchment, ‘being scribbled o’er, should undo a man’ (4.2.74). Here again, 
Shakespeare conflates Cade’s Rebellion with the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. As I. M. W. 
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Harvey observes, by the fifteenth century ‘nearly every rebel leader […] had his scribe or 
secretary and a messenger service.’80 Nevertheless, the spirit of the complaint might be said 
to still stand. Education remained in Shakespeare’s own lifetime, as today, a velvet rope 
between the haves and the have-nots. 
‘Dost thou use to write thy name?’ Cade asks the clerk, ‘Or hast thou a mark to 
thyself, like an honest plain-dealing man?’ (4.2.93–95) In court, the ability to read could be 
literally life-saving. Among Cade’s denunciations of Lord Saye appears the charge that ‘thou 
hast put [poor men] in prison, and because they could not read thou hast hanged them’ 
(4.7.39–41). Cade refers here to a legal procedure known as the ‘benefit of clergy’ whereby 
condemned criminals could escape the death penalty if they could recite the ‘neck verse’, 
Psalm 51.1. Ben Jonson is a famous example of a member of the educated class saved by an 
appeal to this loophole, and it was surprisingly widespread. David Cressy refers us to the 
Middlesex records, where it is written that in the reign of Elizabeth 32% of capital felons 
successfully pleaded benefit of clergy in this manner.
81
 It is this kind of unfair practice, then, 
which prompts Shakespeare’s peasants’ hatred here of the literate.  
For the common people of Shakespeare’s England, violent agitation is a means to 
register political opposition, when all other efforts at participation in their own governance 
seem futile. Earlier in the play, before Cade’s revolt, the commons demand that the Duke of 
Suffolk ‘straight be done to death, / Or banished fair England’s territories’. ‘An answer from 
the King’, comes the shout, ‘or we will all break in!’ (3.2.244–5, 278) The king professes that 
he already purposed to act ‘as they do entreat’; nonetheless, Suffolk’s banishment does seem 
to require their final push. As the commoners’ army faces the Staffords’, Cade assures Dick 
that ‘then are we in order when we are most out of order’ (4.2.178–9). The comment could 
easily come across as a passing joke, but it pierces to the heart of the matter: it is precisely in 
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disorder that the commons are most effective politically. They enter the theatre of political 
authority – the realm of order – only when they rebel.  
 
8: The Language of the ‘Educated Middle Class’ 
 
 In his Politics, Hegel expresses some concern about the language of the ‘educated 
middle class’, that is, the class which tends to become civil servants. ‘Alienated from the 
people, officials become, by reason of their skill, themselves the object of the people’s fear; 
even the way they talk strikes the ears of citizens as gibberish, a kind of thieves’ slang.’ It is 
vital, therefore, that ministers engaged in public debate in the assemblies of the Estates be, as 
Thom Brooks explains, ‘forced to make a case for political decisions that non-experts can 
understand.’82 As Hegel insists, ‘Officials must … accustom themselves to a popular 
approach, to popular language, and seek to overcome the difficulties this occasions them.’83 
 In keeping with Hegel’s sense of a political risk, in Julius Caesar, as well as 
Coriolanus, Shakespeare illustrates the grave importance of the tone in which the political 
elite communicate with the people. In each play, Shakespeare draws a pointed contrast 
between the public speeches of two very different aristocratic speakers: Brutus as opposed to 
Mark Antony in Julius Caesar and Menenius as opposed to Coriolanus in Coriolanus. And in 
both cases, manner proves just as important, if not more so, than matter.  
 Coriolanus, in particular, begins with a sharp contrast between Menenius and 
Coriolanus. The play opens with the plebeians in arms, demanding lower food prices: ‘corn at 
their own rates’ (1.1.183). In responding to this riot, both aristocrats want the same objective 
result, the status quo. Coriolanus, however, badly botches the subjective diplomacy necessary 
to maintain it. Menenius is the first to address the angry mob, and he is immediately well-
received, welcomed by the rioters as ‘one that hath always loved the people’ (1.1.46-7). After 
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some conversation, he is able to calm them and begin to reorient their anger towards the 
enemies of Rome; calm them, that is, until Coriolanus arrives, who immediately denounces 
the crowd as ‘dissentious rogues’. After a long tirade, heaping insult upon insult, Coriolanus 
does not stay for an answer, but instead ignores the on-stage crowd altogether and speaks 
solely to Menenius. Finally he turns and dismisses them outright: ‘Go, get you home, you 
fragments!’ (1.1.217).    
 Menenius’ interaction with the restive plebeians could easily serve as a model of the 
kind of public engagement which Hegel sees as crucial to the prevention of subjective 
alienation of the poor. He hears their complaints patiently, addresses them as his 
‘countrymen’ (1.1.50), ‘friends’ (1.1.57, 60), ‘neighbors’ (1.1.57), even ‘masters’ (1.1.58), 
and justifies the current price of grain by recounting what he calls, with typical, self-
deprecating humour, ‘a pretty tale’ (1.1.85). Using a humorous, allegorical fable, Menenius 
compares the state to the body and the aristocracy to the belly, an organ which seems useless 
but in fact carries out an important task of redistribution. He acknowledges the people’s 
‘suffering’ (1.1.62) and insists repeatedly that the patricians feel ‘most charitable care’ 
towards them (1.1.60); the ‘helms o’th’state,’ he maintains, ‘care for you like fathers’ 
(1.1.72). 
 Coriolanus in contrast makes no such concessions. Rather than patiently explaining 
the reasons of state, as Menenius does, he mocks the very idea that the people of Rome might 
‘sit by the fire and presume to know / What’s done in the Capitol’ (1.1.186-7). ‘Hang ‘em!’ 
he repeatedly exclaims (1.1.185, 199; cp. 1.1.176). ‘Nay,’ Menenius replies, ‘they are almost 
thoroughly persuaded’ (1.1.196). Towards the beginning of the scene, before Menenius tells 
his fable of the belly, one of the citizens protests, ‘you must not think fob off our disgrace 
with a tale’ (1.1.89). In a sense, though, Menenius does exactly that. Through the kind of 
public outreach Hegel prescribes, an explanation of policy in plain language, he is able to 
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appease the people of Rome without actually conceding to any of their material demands. 
Coriolanus in contrast aggravates the problem by his refusal as he says to ‘flatter’ the 
plebeians (1.1.162). ‘We have ever your good word’ (1.1.161), one of the citizens remarks, 
sarcastically. Taken as a whole, what the scene suggests is that what the citizens want, even 
more than ‘corn gratis’ (3.1.126), is a ‘good word’. As Menenius explains to Coriolanus, later 
on, after he has once again offended the plebeians, ‘they have pardons, being asked, as free / 
As words to little purpose’ (3.2.88-9). That is to say, bluntly put, recognition is more 
important to the poor than actual reform. 
 Another version of this contrast between engaging the public and estranging it appears 
in Julius Caesar, in the rival funeral orations of Brutus and Mark Antony. Plutarch records 
that Brutus’ two speeches did not convince the people. The first was received with ‘great 
silence’; it seemed that the people ‘neither greatly reproved, nor allowed the fact’ of the 
murder.
84
 During the second, ‘they gave him quiet audience: howbeit, immediately after, they 
showed that they were not all contented with the murder’.85  In Shakespeare’s version, Brutus 
is too calm, too abstract, too aloof, and too self-satisfied. As Patrick Gray suggests, Brutus 
takes too much pride in his sense of himself as an intellectual to deign to explain his actions 
in terms that his audience can understand. ‘Conceding nothing to what we might now call 
optics, pausing at no point for any tug on the proverbial heart-strings, Brutus instead presses 
hoi polloi with challenging, elliptical counterfactuals and conditionals, in the manner of a 
present-day analytic philosopher. “Had you rather Caesar were living, and die all slaves, than 
that Caesar were dead, to live all freemen?” (3.2.22-4).’86 Hegel’s sense that the language of 
the educated may seem merely ‘gibberish’ to the masses is in this case hauntingly apt. ‘If… if 
then … this is my answer’: Brutus’s brusque, interlocking ‘if … then’ statements leave his 
audience merely confused. ‘Let him be Caesar’ (3.2.51), they cry.  
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 Like Menenius, telling his ‘pretty tale,’ Antony takes pains in contrast to incorporate 
concrete illustrations of his claims. Brutus talks about love, valour, and ambition; Antony 
says instead that Caesar filled Rome’s coffers; he wept when the poor cried; he refused the 
crown when it was offered. Antony also takes advantage of visual effects. In Coriolanus, 
Volumnia urges her son to go to the people hat in hand, kneeling before them. ‘For in such 
business,’ she explains, ‘Action is eloquence, and the eyes of th’ignorant / More learned than 
the ears’ (3.2.76-8). As if with this principle in mind, Antony shows the people the rents in 
Caesar’s cloak, made by the knives of the conspirators; finally, Caesar’s body itself. He is not 
squeamish about showing emotion, as Brutus is: ‘poor soul,’ one of the citizens remarks, ‘his 
eyes are red with weeping’ (3.2.164). Antony, however, is more cold-blooded than he lets on. 
‘Now let it work,’ he says, in an aside; ‘Mischief, thou art afoot’ (3.2.251). His populism is 
disingenuous. Antony uses the promises in Caesar’s will, the money and the land which he 
claims Caesar grants to the people, as a means to provoke a riot; the very next scene, 
however, shows him scheming ‘how to cut off some charge in [these] legacies’ (4.1.9). 
Nevertheless, his methods are effective. By stepping down from the rostrum and mixing with 
the people, speaking to them in their own fashion, Antony is able to manipulate them to his 
own ends. Like Henry V, he understands the importance of ‘the common touch’. 
 
 9. The Monarch at War 
 
Like most of his contemporaries, Shakespeare seems to be in favour of the classical 
ideal of ‘mixed government’ popularized by Polybius and Cicero, one which combines 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.
87
 What need, however, of a king? Shakespeare, like 
Hegel, seems to see the active presence of a hereditary monarch as a binding influence, 
crucial to forestalling the subjective alienation of the poor.
88
 In defence of monarchy, Hegel 
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argues that ‘without its monarch and that articulation of the whole which is necessarily and 
immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a formless mass’ (PR §279R). In other 
words, a people without a king is effectively a rabble. The monarch is the state personified: 
‘the actual unity of the state’ (PR §281). Shakespeare for his part suggests such a role for the 
monarch in the pointed contrast that he draws between Henry V and his son, Henry VI.  In 
Shakespeare’s first tetralogy of history plays, Henry VI’s naïve, feeble dereliction of his 
duties creates a power vacuum which is rapidly filled by scheming rival nobles, leading to 
civil war and, indirectly, through the efforts of the Duke of York, the revolt of the commons 
under the leadership of Jack Cade. To put an end to that rebellion, Old Clifford must evoke 
the memory, in contrast, of Henry VI’s father, Henry V: ‘The name of Henry the Fifth hales 
them to a hundred mischiefs,’ Cade laments, ‘and makes them leave me desolate’ (4.8.56).  
 How exactly, however, does the king unify the state? Hegel looks to war, which the 
monarch alone may lead. ‘[The state’s] relationship with other states therefore comes under 
the power of the sovereign, who therefore has direct and sole responsibility for the command 
of the armed forces, […] for making war and peace.’ (PR §329) ‘Not only do peoples emerge 
from wars with added strength,’ Hegel argues, ‘but nations troubled by civil dissension gain 
internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies’ (PR §324A). ‘This is apparent,’ 
he adds, ‘in various occurrences in history, as when successful wars have averted internal 
unrest and consolidated the internal power of the state’ (§ 324R). To this sentence Allen 
Wood adds in a note: ‘Perhaps an allusion to the dying words of Shakespeare’s King Henry 
IV.’89 ‘Be it thy course,’ Henry IV tells his son, ‘to busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels’ 
(4.5.212-3).
90
 The connection is not altogether implausible; Hegel is known to have had a 
‘conversant’ knowledge of Shakespeare’s works, even composing an alternative version of a 
scene from Julius Caesar when he was a teenager.
91
 Wars of foreign conquest are not much 
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to our taste today; to Shakespeare, however, as well as Hegel, they seem to have been 
preferable to civil war at home. 
 
 10. Conclusion 
 
In sum, Shakespeare, like Hegel, seems to favour the kind of mixed government 
advocated by Polybius and Cicero, incorporating elements of monarchy and aristocracy, as 
well as democracy. In this sense, he is closer to Hegel than to Marx – Lefebvre’s professed 
intellectual guiding light. Nonetheless, precisely here, in their surprising resemblance to 
Hegel, it is possible to discern some common ground between Shakespeare and Lefebvre 
after all. Both see working-class mob violence as a response to alienation: alienation which is 
as much subjective as objective. Shakespeare’s rebels and rioters are responding to a sense of 
disrespect and disempowerment, as much as they are to any more material economic 
deprivation. Within the Hegelian tradition, Charles Taylor, Francis Fukuyama, and Axel 
Honneth have written extensively on the desire for recognition as an engine of political 
conflict. Violence is not always coldly calculating, but instead, and more often, as they see it, 
spurred on by an emotion: indignation. Shakespeare’s peasants and plebeians want to be 
recognized as part of the political process, even if their role is only relatively limited: in the 
language of Coriolanus, they want their ‘voices’ to be heard. Riots and rebellions are their 
way of reasserting and protecting that right. 
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